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STATUTES REPRODUCED 
Utah Code Ann, § 13-1-12 (Supp 1992). 
(1) (a) At the close of an adjudicative proceeding, the 
administrative law judge or an occupational board or 
representative committee with cissistance from the administrative 
law judge, shall issue an order. 
(b) The order may be appealed to the executive director or 
the division director for review. 
(2) If a division director is unable for any reason to 
fairly review or rule upon an order of the administrative law 
judge or a board or committee, the executive director shall 
review and rule upon the order. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-2 (1990). 
For purposes of this title: 
(1) "Department" means the Department of Commerce. 
(2) "Director" means the director of the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing. 
(3) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing. 
(4) "Executive director" means the executive director of 
the Department of Commerce. 
(5) "Licensee" includes any holder of a license, 
certificate, permit, student card, or apprentice card authorized 
under this title. 
(6) "Unprofessional conduct" means acts, knowledge, and 
practices which fail to conform with the accepted standards of 
the specific licensed occupation or profession and which could 
jeopardize the public health, safety, or welfare and includes 
the violation of any statute regulating an occupation or 
profession under this title. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-4 (Supp. 1992). 
(1) The division shall be under the supervision, direction, 
and control of a director. The director shall be appointed by 
the executive director with the approval of the governor. The 
director shall hold office at the pleasure of the governor. 
(2) The director shall perform all duties, functions, and 
responsibilities assigned to the division by law or rule and, 
where provided, with the collaboration and assistance of the 
boards established under this title. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-6 (Supp. 1992). 
The duties, functions, and responsibilities of the division 
include, but are not limited to, the following: 
(1) prescribing, adopting, and enforcing rules to 
administer this title; 
(2) investigating the activities of any person governed by 
the laws and rules administered and enforced by the division; 
(3) subpoenaing witnesses, taking evidence, and requiring 
by subpoena duces tecum the production of any books, papers, 
documents, records, contracts, recordings, tapes, 
correspondence, or information relevant to an investigation upon 
a finding a sufficient need by the director; 
(4) taking administrative and judicial action against 
persons in violation of the laws and rules administered and 
enforced by the division, including, but not limited to, the 
issuance of cease and desist orders; 
(5) seeking injunctions and temporary restraining orders 
to restrain unauthorized activity; 
(6) giving public notice of board meetings; 
(7) keeping records of board meetings, proceedings, and 
actions and making those records available for public inspection 
upon request; 
(8) issuing, refusing to issue, revoking, suspending, 
renewing, refusing to renew, or otherwise acting upon any 
license or licensee; 
(9) preparing and submitting to the governor and the 
Legislature an annual report of the division's operations, 
activities, and goals; 
(10) preparing and submitting to the executive director of 
the department a budget of the expenses for the division; 
(11) establishing the time and place for the 
administration of examinations; and 
(12) preparing lists of licensees and making these lists 
available to the public at cost upon request unless otherwise 
prohibited by state or federal law, 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-8.5 (1990). 
All boards created under the authority of this chapter shall 
comply with the procedures and requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, in their adjudicative proceedings. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-15 (Supp. 1992). 
The division may refuse to issue or renew, and may suspend, 
revoke, or place on probation the license of any licensee who: 
(1) is or has been guilty of unprofessional conduct, as 
defined by statute or rule; 
(2) has been convicted of a crime involving moral 
turpitude which, when considered with the functions and duties 
of the occupation or profession for which the license was 
issued, demonstrates a threat to the public health, safety, and 
welfare; 
(3) has obtained or attempted to obtain a license by 
misrepresentation; or 
(4) fails to pay the renewal fee or secure a renewal of 
the license within the time fixed by statute or rule. 
Section § 58-1-16 (Supp. 1992) 
(1) (a) Before suspending, revoking, placing on 
probationer refusing to renew a license, and before 
issuing a cease and desist order, the division shall 
comply with the procedures and requirements of Title 
63, Chapter 4 6b, Administrative Procedures Act; 
however, before proceeding under the provisions of 
Section 63-46b-20, providing for emergency adjudicative 
proceedings, the division shall review the proposed 
action with a committee of licensees appointed by the 
licensing board established under this title for the 
profession of the person against whom the action is 
proposed. 
(b) By complying with the procedures and requirements 
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, the director may hold or 
cause to be held administrative hearings regarding any 
other matter affecting the division or the activities 
of any person authorized to practice his occupation or 
profession under this title. 
(2) (a) All adjudicative proceedings shall be held 
before enn appropriate presiding officer, as designated 
by the director, (b) The presiding officer shall make 
written recommendations for action, findings of fact, 
and conclusions of law. 
(c) The director, with the concurrence of the 
appropriate board, may issue a written order based on 
the recommendations but is not bound to follow the 
recommendations of the presiding officer. 
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(d) If the director does not issue an order within ten 
days after the presiding officer has made the 
recommendations, the recommendations of the presiding 
officer shall become the order. 
(3) (a) The director or his designee may administer 
oaths, issue subpoenas, and compel the attendance of 
witnesses and the production of papers, books, 
accounts, documents, and evidence, 
(b) Any party to any action permitted under this 
section may issue subpoenas and compel the attendance 
of witnesses and the production of papers, books, 
accounts, documents, and evidence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-17-9 (Supp. 1992). 
The division, in collaboration with the board, may refuse to 
issue or renew, or may suspend, revoke, or restrict the license 
of any person, upon one or more of the following grounds: 
(1) any condition that prevents a pharmacist or licensed 
intern from engaging in the practice of pharmacy with reasonable 
skill, competence, and safety to the public; 
(2) being found guilty by a court of competent 
jurisdiction of one or more of the following: 
(a) a felony; 
(b) any act involving moral turpitude or gross 
immorality; 
(c) violations of the pharmacy, drug, alcohol, and 
chemical dependencies laws of this state or rules pertaining to 
them, or of statutes, rules, or regulations of any other state 
in which the licensee engages in the practice of pharmacy, or of 
the federal government; 
(3) fraud or intentional misrepresentation by any licensee 
in securing the issuance or renewal of a license; 
(4) engaging or aiding and abetting an individual to 
engage in the practice of pharmacy without a license, or falsely 
using the title of pharmacist; 
(5) being found by the board to be in violation of this 
chapter or rules adopted under this chapter; 
(6) acts of unprofessional conduct as defined by statute 
or by rule of the division, in collaboration with the board, as 
follows: 
(a) willfully deceiving or attempting to deceive the 
board or its agents as to any relevant matter; 
(b) paying rebates to practitioners or any other health 
care providers, or entering into any agreement with a medical 
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practitioner or any other person for the payment or acceptance 
of compensation or its economic equivalent for recommending of 
the professional services of either party, except that price 
discounts that are conditional upon volume purchases are not 
prohibited; 
(c) misbranding or adulteration of any drug or device, 
or the sale, distribution, or dispensing of any misbranded or 
adulterated drug or device; 
(d) engaging in the sale or purchase of drugs or devices 
that are samples or packages bearing the inscription "sample" or 
"not for resale" or similar words or phrases; 
(e) accepting back and redistribution of any unused 
drug, or a part of it, after it has left the premises of any 
pharmacy, unless the drug is in the original sealed unit dose 
package or manufacturer's sealed container; 
(f) being employed as a pharmacist or intern, or sharing 
or receiving compensation in any form arising out of an act 
incidental to the professional activities in which any person 
requires him to engage in any aspects of the practice of 
pharmacy in violation of this chapter; and 
(g) violation of the federal Controlled Substances Act, 
the Utah Controlled Substances Act, or rules and regulations 
adopted under either of them. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-17-11 (1990) 
(1) Upon finding grounds for discipline of any person 
holding a license, seeking a license, or a renewal license under 
this chapter, the division, in collaboration with the board, may 
impose one or more of the following penalties: 
(a) suspending the offender's license for a term to be 
determined by the board; 
(b) revoking the offender's license; 
(c) restricting the offender's license to prohibit the 
offender from performing certain acts or from engaging in the 
practice of pharmacy in a particular manner for a term to be 
determined by the division, in collaboration with the board; 
(d) refusing to renew the offender's license; 
(e) placing of the offender on probation and supervision 
for a period to be determined by the division in collaboration 
with the board. 
(2) Any drug outlet found by the board, after a hearing 
before the board, to have engaged in the practice of pharmacy in 
Utah without a license under this chapter or to have permitted 
any person to engage in the practice of pharmacy in Utah from 
that drug outlet in violation of this chapter, and any 
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out-of-state mail service pharmacy found by the board, after a 
hearing before the board, to have, without a license under this 
chapter: 
(a) shipped, mailed, or delivered by any means a dispensed 
legend drug to a resident in Utah; 
(b) provided information to a resident of this state on 
drugs or devices which may include, but is not limited to, 
advice relating to therapeutic values, potential hazards, and 
uses; or 
(c) counseled pharmacy patients residing in this state 
concerning adverse and therapeutic effects of drugs, shall be 
subject to the following: 
(i) revocation, suspension, or probation of license; 
(ii) a fine of up to $2,000 for each day in which the 
violation occurred; 
(iii) assessment of costs associated with the 
investigation, hearing, and all litigation required to finally 
resolve the finding. 
(3) Any person whose license to practice pharmacy in this 
state has been suspended, revoked, or restricted under this 
chapter, whether voluntarily or by action of the division, may 
at reasonable intervals petition the division for reinstatement 
of the license. The petition shall be made in writing and in a 
form prescribed by the division. Upon investigation and hearing, 
the division may grant or deny the petition, or it may modify 
its original finding to reflect any circumstances which have 
changed sufficiently to warrant the modifications. 
(4) Nothing in this chapter bars criminal prosecutions for 
violations of this chapter if the violations are deemed criminal 
offenses under other statutes of this state or of the United 
States. 
(5) Final decisions by the division are subject to judicial 
review under Title 58, Chapter 1. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-2 (1989) 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "Adjudicative proceeding" means an agency action or 
proceeding described in Section 63-46b-l. 
(b) "Agency" means a board, commission, department, 
division, officer, council, office, committee, bureau, or other 
administrative unit of this state, including the agency head, 
agency employees, or other persons acting on behalf of or under 
the authority of the agency head, but does not mean the 
Legislature, the courts, the governor, any political subdivision 
x 
of the state, or any administrative unit of a political 
subdivision of the state. 
(c) "Agency head" means an individual or body of 
individuals in whom the ultimate legal authority of the agency 
is vested by statute. 
(d) "Declaratory proceeding" means a proceeding authorized 
and governed by Section 63-46b-21. 
(e) "License" means a franchise, permit, certification, 
approval, registration, charter, or similar form of 
authorization required by statute. 
(f) "Party" means the agency or other person commencing an 
adjudicative proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted 
by the presiding officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all 
persons authorized by statute or agency rule to participate as 
parties in an adjudicative proceeding. 
(g) "Person" means an individual, group of individuals, 
partnership, corporation, association, political subdivision or 
its units, governmental subdivision or its units, public or 
private organization or entity of any character, or another 
agency. 
(h) (i) "Presiding officer" means an agency head, or an 
individual or body of individuals designated by the agency head, 
by the agency's rules, or by statute to conduct an adjudicative 
proceeding. 
(ii) If fairness to th€* parties is not compromised, an 
agency may substitute one presiding officer for another during 
any proceeding. 
(iii) A person who acts as a presiding officer at one 
phase of a proceeding need not continue as presiding officer 
through all phases of a proceeding. 
(i) "Respondent" means a person against whom an 
adjudicative proceeding is initiated, whether by an agency or 
any other person. 
(j) "Superior agency" means an agency required or 
authorized by law to review the orders of another agency. 
(2) This section does not prohibit an agency from 
designating by rule the names or titles of the agency head or 
the presiding officers with responsibility for adjudicative 
proceedings before the agency. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 (1989). 
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties 
to any adjudicative proceeding to seek review of an order by the 
agency or by a superior agency, the aggrieved party may file a 
written request for review within 30 days after the issuance of 
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the order with the person or entity designated for that purpose 
by the statute or rule. 
(b) The request shall: 
(i) be signed by the party seeking review; 
(ii) state the grounds for review and the relief 
requested; 
(iii) state the date upon which it was mailed; and 
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer and to 
each party. 
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the request for 
review, or within the time period provided by agency rule, 
whichever is longer, any party may file a response with the 
person designated by statute or rule to receive the response. 
One copy of the response shall be sent by mail to each of the 
parties and to the presiding officer. 
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review of an 
order by the agency or a superior agency, the agency or superior 
agency shall review the order within a reasonable time or within 
the time required by statute or the agency's rules. 
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior agency may 
by order or rule permit the parties to file briefs or other 
papers, or to conduct oral argument. 
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to all 
parties. 
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of any 
response, other filings, or oral argument, or within the time 
required by statute or applicable rules, the agency or superior 
agency shall issue a written order on review. 
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the agency head 
or by a person designated by the agency for that purpose and 
shall be mailed to each party. 
(c) The order on review shall contain: 
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or 
requiring review; 
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed; 
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues 
reviewed; 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues 
reviewed; 
(v) the reasons for the disposition; 
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or 
agency is to be affirmed, reversed, or modified, and whether alJ 
or any portion of the adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded; 
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative 
reconsideration or judicial review available to aggrieved 
parties; and 
xii 
(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or 
review. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989). 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court 
of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency action 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner 
shall file a petition for review of agency action with the 
appropriate appellate court in the form required by the 
appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court 
shall govern all additional filings and proceedings in the 
appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's 
record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings 
are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, except 
that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing 
transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to 
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the 
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person 
seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any 
of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the 
agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as 
applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred 
by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring 
resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the 
law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or 
decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed 
procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally 
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to 
disqualification; 
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(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of 
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency 
by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless 
the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and 
reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1992). 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all 
extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process 
necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and 
decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the 
district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, 
and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 
63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the 
small claims department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital 
felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving any 
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other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a 
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree 
or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the ordc^ rs on petitions for extraordinary 
writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons except 
in cases involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic 
relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, 
annulment, property division, child custody, support, 
visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(J) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by 
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme 
Court for original appellate review and determination any matter 
over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements 
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative 
proceedings. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal of a final order issued by an 
administrative agency of the State of Utah following a formal 
adjudicative proceeding. This Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3(2)(a)(1992) and 63-
46b-16 (1989). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-l to -22 (1990), applies to this appeal. 
1. Was the Division's order revoking Pickett's license to 
prescribe controlled substances and placing his pharmacy license 
on three years probation arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of 
its discretion? 
Standard of Review: The Division and Pharmacy Board are 
vested with broad discretion to impose disciplinary sanctions 
ranging from probation or restricting a license, to revocation or 
suspension of a license. Utah Code Ann. § 58-17-9 and -11 (1990), 
The court should defer to the agency's exercise of its discretion 
in imposing discipline unless the agency's decision is "clearly 
unreasonable" or a clear abuse of its discretion. Johnson Bowles 
Co. v. Division of Securities, 829 P.2d 101 (Utah App. 1992), 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(h)(i)(iv) (1989). 
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2. Did the Division Director's participation in the 
proceedings deprive Pickett of due process of law.1 
Standard of Review: The court reviews constitutional 
questions for correctness. Morton International, Inc. v. Utah Tax 
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
3. Is the Division's ord€>r invalid due to the lack of a 
signature by an appropriate presiding officer? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law 
which the court should review for correctness - Morton 
International, Inc. v. Utah Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
4. Is the Division's order invalid due the failure of the 
Division to obtain the concurrence of the Board of Pharmacy as 
required under Utah Code Ann § 58-1-16 (1990)? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law 
which the court should review for correctness - Morton 
International, Inc. v. Utah Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 28, 1992, the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing ("Division") issued a Notice of Agency 
Action commencing formal adjudicative proceedings against the 
licenses of Appellant, Jack W. Pickett, ("Pickett") to practice 
x
. Pickett does not reveal whether he is challenging the 
Division Director's conduct under the Utah or Federal 
Constitutions. 
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as a pharmacist and dispense controlled substances in the State 
of Utah. The Notice of Agency Action and Petition alleged 
numerous violations of the Controlled Substances Act and Rules as 
well as the Statutes and Rules governing the practice of 
Pharmacy. 
A formal hearing on the charges was heard on May 26, 19 9 2 by 
the Pharmacy Licensing Board and Administrative Law Judge, J. 
Steven Eklund. As a result of the hearing, Pickett's license to 
practice as a pharmacist was placed on three months probation and 
his license to dispense controlled substances was revoked. The 
order of the Division was subsequently reviewed and affirmed by 
the Department of Commerce on July 30, 1992. This appeal 
followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because Pickett does not dispute the Division's factual 
findings, (Brief at 20), the following findings of fact are taken 
essentially verbatim from the findings of fact issued by the 
Division on June 24, 1992. 
At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent, Jack 
W. Pickett ("Pickett") has held separate licenses to practice as 
a pharmacist and to dispense controlled substances in the State 
of Utah. Pickett initially received his pharmacist license 
around 1954. Respondent, Servus Drug Co., has been licensed at 
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all times relevant to this proceeding as a pharmacy and 
dispensary of controlled substances in the State of Utah. 
Pickett is employed by Servus Drug Co. which is owned by 
Pickett's spouse. 
On twelve separate occasions between May 20, 1991 and July 
30, 1991, Pickett dispensed various dosages of either traxene, a 
schedule IV controlled substance, or Esgic, a Schedule III 
controlled substance, without a physician's authorization to do 
so. On occasions, Pickett dispensed medications in either 
unlabeled prescription vials or a paper bag bearing no labels or 
instructions. 
There is a lack of sufficient evidence that Pickett made 
false or forged prescriptions as to dispense the above-stated 
controlled substances or other medications. Further, there is a 
lack of sufficient evidence to conclude Pickett knew Mr. Schriver 
was drug dependant, Pickett acknowledges his prescriptive 
practices were improper and he failed to adequately document the 
controlled substances or other medications which he dispensed. 
Pickett often dispensed those controlled substances or other 
medications in the manner requested by Mr. Schriver, who often 
suggested the used of either an unlabeled vials or other 
inappropriate containers. 
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There is no substantial evidence Pickett has improperly 
dispensed controlled substances or other medications to other 
individuals. Pickett asserts he has taken remedial measures to 
address the acknowledged deficiencies in his practices now under 
review. However, there is a lack of substantial evidence as the 
specific nature of the corrective measures Pickett may have taken 
in that regard. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I- THE DIVISION AND BOARD IMPOSED A REASONABLE 
SANCTION AGAINST PICKETT'S LICENSES. 
The decision of the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing ("Division") revoking Pickett's license to 
dispense controlled substances and placing his pharmacist's 
license on three years probation was reasonable an well within 
the discretion vested in the Division and the Pharmacy Board. 
The order was not unreasonable in lieu of the Board's past 
treatment of professional misconduct by pharmacists and is not 
subject to the obscure limitations of stare decisis. Pickett's 
conduct involved numerous serious violations of the controlled 
substances act as well as the statutes and rules that govern the 
pharmacist profession. The court should not disturb the sanction 
imposed by the Division unless it finds that the Division abused 
its discretion and imposed an unreasonable sanction. 
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II. THE DIVISION FOLLOWED THE PROPER PROCEDURES FOR 
FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS. 
Pickett alleges that the Division violated its own statutory 
procedures by allowing the participation of the Division Director 
as a presiding officer and by failing to obtain the signatures of 
the ALJ and Board on the findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
order. Pickett also alleges that the Division failed to obtain 
the necessary concurrence from the Board before issuing its 
order. 
Pickett's arguments should fail for two reasons. First, 
Pickett was given adequate notice concerning the manner in which 
the hearing would be conducted. (R./61, 67) However, Pickett 
did not raise any objection prior to, or during the hearing. 
Pickett's failure to preserve this issue on appeal prevent him 
from obtaining any relief based on alleged procedural errors. 
Second, Pickett's procedural challenges to the involvment of 
the Division Director as a presiding officer is ignorant of the 
fact that the section 58-1-16 as well as sections 58-17-9 and -11 
vest authority in the Division and its Director to take 
appropriate disciplinary action in concurrence with the Pharmacy 
Board. Utah Code Ann. §§ (1990 and Supp. 1992). The Division 
Director is an agency head as contemplated by the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act and may substitute one presiding 
officer for another at different phases of a proceeding. 
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Moreover, Pickett has failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced 
in any manner by the Division's failure to follow the correct 
statutory procedures. 
III. THE DIVISION DIRECTOR DID NOT DEPRIVE PICKETT OF 
A FAIR HEARING. 
Pointed and direct questions asked by the Director, David E. 
Robinson, at the hearing does not constitute a violation of due 
process. Given the minimal detail surrounding the events that 
led up to the bringing of disciplinary proceedings against 
Pickett's licenses, the Director was entitled to ask questions 
and probe into matters that were not adequately addressed during 
direct and cross-examination by respective counsel. The 
Director's questions did not rise to a level of due process 
violation. Moreover, no objection was raised by Pickett, who was 
represented by counsel, to any of the questions posed by the 
Director. Consequently, Pickett has waive the right to raise 
this as an issue on appeal. 
IV. THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR WAS NOT BIASED AGAINST PICKETT 
Pickett has raised insufficient grounds to even cast an 
inference of bias on the part of the Executive Director of the 
Department of Commerce. There can be no inference of bias by 
virtue of the fact that David Robinson was appointed by the last 
Executive Director of the Department of Commerce (and approved by 
the Governor) The Executive Director conducted agency review in 
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accordance with the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. No 
rehearing was required and no oral argument was taken because 
none was requested. (R./l) 
V. PICKETT WAIVED THE REQUIREMENT OF A QUORUM 
Pickett urges that he waived the requirement of a quorum so 
that the hearing could be conducted but intended for there to be 
a quorum of the board to deliberate on his case. (Brief at: 17) 
Other than Pickett's bald assertion there is not support for his 
contention in the record. His intent that a complete quorum 
deliberate on his case was not expressed to the Division nor is 
it reflected in the record. Consequently, Pickett has not 
marshalled the evidence to support his argument on this issue on 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE DIVISION'S ORDER REVOKING PICKETT'S CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE LICENSE AND PLACING HIS PHARMACIST'S LICENSE 
ON PROBATION WAS REASONABLE AND WITHIN THE DIVISION'S 
DISCRETION. 
Pickett does not dispute the Division's factual findings, 
nor has he ever denied that the conduct he engaged in was 
violative of the statutory and regulatory standards governing the 
dispensing of controlled substances or the licensure of 
pharmacists. (Brief at 7-8, 20) However, Pickett urges on appeal 
that the sanction imposed by the Division is not justified in 
light of the Pharmacy Board's findings of fact and prior 
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decisions of the Pharmacy Board in prior cases.2 Before 
addressing this issue on the merits, it is necessary to determine 
which standard of review the court will apply in reviewing the 
sanction imposed by the Division and the Board. 
A. ABUSE OF DISCRETION STANDARD OF REVIEW SHOULD APPLY 
TO DIVISION'S IMPOSITION OF A SANCTION. 
In reviewing Pickett's appeal on this issue, the Court of 
Appeals should review the Division's order under the abuse of 
discretion standard of review. See, Johnson-Bowles v. Division 
of Securities, 829 P.2d 101, 115, (1992)(Applying Morton 3 
standard of review analysis.) In Johnson, the court reviewed a 
statute granting the Division of Securities the power to impose 
sanctions and concluded that the Division possessed broad 
discretionary authority to impose disciplinary action against 
registered brokers or agents of the Division.4 JEd. at 116. 
No adverse findings or sanction was imposed against 
appellant, Servus Drug Co. It is unclear why the company is 
appealing other than for reasons that the sanction imposed against 
Pickett bears some negative consequences for the company. 
3
. Morton International, Inc. v. Utah Tax Comm'n, 814 P. 2d 
581 (Utah 1991). Sparing a detailed standard of review analysis, 
Morton provides a comprehensive analysis of cases addressing the 
standards of appellate review from administrative agency decisions. 
A
. The statute granting sanction powers to the Division of 
Securities provides in pertinent part: 
Upon approval by the executive director and a 
majority of the Securities Advisory Board, the 
executive director may issue and order 
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Based on the broad range of disciplinary options available to the 
Division, the court concluded that the type of sanction and the 
"reasonableness" of the sanction "is a matter of agency 
discretion" which would not be disturbed unless "clearly 
unreasonable or otherwise an abuse of discretion." Id. 
The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 
like the Division of Securities, is a subdivision of the 
Department of Commerce and likewise has been given a broad range 
of regulatory powers including the express authority to impose 
discipline against licensee's who violate the applicable statutes 
and rules of the profession. First, in a more general 
delegation, section 58-1-15 provides that the Division "may 
refuse to issue or renew, and may suspend, revoke, or place on 
probation the license of any licensee who: (1) is or has been 
guilty of unprofessional conduct, as defined by statute or rule . 
. ." Utah Code Ann. § (19 9 2 Cum Supp.). 
Similar provisions, but more specifically tailored to 
pharmacy profession, are two provisions which require the 
Division to act in collaboration with the Pharmacy Board when 
denying, suspending or revoking andy agent, 
broker-dealer, or investment adviser 
registration if he finds that the order is in 
the public interest . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-6(1)(1989). 
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imposing sanctions against licensed pharmacists. Section 58-17-9 
provides that the Division, in collaboration with the Board, may 
refuse to issue or renew, or may suspend, revoke, or restrict the 
license of any person, upon one or more of grounds (which are 
both numerous and lengthy) stated in that provision. Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-17-9 (1992 Supp.) In addition, there is section 
58-17-11 which provides that: 
(1) Upon finding grounds for discipline of any person 
holding a license, seeking a license, or a renewal 
license under this chapter, the division, in 
collaboration with the board, may impose one or more of 
the following penalties: 
(a) suspending the offender's license for a term to be 
determined by the board; 
(b) revoking the offender's license; 
(c) restricting the offender's license to prohibit the 
offender from performing certain acts or from engaging 
in the practice of pharmacy in a particular manner for 
a term to be determined by the division, in 
collaboration with the board; 
(d) refusing to renew the offender's license; 
(e) placing of the offender on probation and 
supervision for a period to be determined by the 
division in collaboration with the board. 
Utah Code Ann. § (1990) 
Given the broad grant of authority to the Division and Board 
to impose sanctions for violations of its statutes, the court 
should defer to the Division's discretion and not disturb the 
Division's order unless it found to be a clear abuse of its 
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discretion. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(h)(i)(1989). 
B, THE SANCTION IMPOSED BY THE BOARD AND DIVISION WAS 
NOT AN ABUSE THEIR DISCRETION 
Besides finding numerous violations of the statutes £ind 
rules applicable to professioncil pharmacists (which are 
uncontroverted), the Pharmacy Board and the Division concluded 
that Pickett was "grossly neglxgent in his practice of pharmacy." 
(R./40) The Board also characterized Pickett's "misconduct" as a 
"egregious departure from those standards which govern his 
profession." (R./41) 
Specifically, the Board found that Pickett dispensed 
prescription drugs on twelve separate occasions "without any 
practitioner's authorization to do so." (R./40) The Board also 
found that "[ujnder the circumstancesr [Pickett] should have 
known Mr. Schriver was attempting to obtain drugs by either fraud 
or misrepresentation." (R./40) 
Pickett also improperly dispensed medications by placing 
controlled substances in an unlabeled vial or paper bag. 
(R./l)(Trans, at 7, 17-18) Pickett also failed to properly label 
the medication indicating what kind of medicine it was and the 
instructions for administering the correct dosage. (R./l)(Trans 
at 7, 18). 
Pickett's conduct resulted in the bringing of a criminal 
charge which was resolved by Pickett's plea of no contest to a 
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charge of Illegal Dispensing of a Controlled Substance, a third 
degree felony.(R./56)(Trans at 13f 14, 30, 31) The conviction 
was resolved by a diversion agreement between Pickett and the 
Second District Court in Davis County. While the conviction did 
not serve as the basis of the Division's disciplinary action it 
does serve to illustrate the serious nature of Pickett's 
misconduct. 
The action taken by the Board and Division was reasonable 
due to the serious nature of Pickett's misconduct and was imposed 
in order to protect the public health and safety. The Board and 
Division manifested their intent to protect the public while 
monitoring Pickett's future conduct and to "prompt necessary 
corrective and remedial action." (R./41) 
Pickett asserts that the revocation of his license to 
dispense controlled substances is "tantamount to depriving him of 
his lifetime profession" (Brief at 2). However, a review of the 
Division's order reflects an intent to protect the public while 
monitoring and promoting rehabilitative efforts on the part of 
Pickett. First, no action was taken against the license of 
Servus Drug Co. which is owned by Pickett's spouse.(R./36) 
Moreover, Pickett's pharmacist license was placed on three years 
probation. Consequently, Pickett will be able to maintain 
viable employment at Servus Drug during the probationary period 
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and there is nothing to preclude Servus Drug from dispensing 
controlled substances so long as Servus Drug employs someone with 
a valid Utah controlled substance license to issue such 
prescriptions. 
The order also reflects an intent to monitor Pickett's 
practices and encourage rehabilitative efforts on his own behalf. 
The order requires to Pickett to submit a practice plan requiring 
Servus Drug to employ a pharmacist to "establish proper record 
keeping, inventory control and dispensary procedures for 
controlled substances at the pharmacy." (R./42) Pickett is also 
required to meet with the Board every month for three months and 
then every six months thereafter until his probation is complete. 
(R./42) The purpose of the meetings is to allow the Board to 
review and adequately monitor the terms of the probation and 
assure that proper procedures are being implemented at Servus 
Drug. The Division will also perform period audits of the 
controlled substance records. (R./42) Finally, Pickett will be 
required to take the jurisprudence examination to assure that he 
is aware of the laws and rules governing the practice of 
pharmacy. 
The order issued by the Division and Board is an excellent 
example of effective governmental regulation. Rather than merely 
sanctioning Pickett and leaving him to go his own way. The 
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Division and Board is assuming an active role in the monitoring 
and rehabilitation of Pickett's practices. It is difficult to 
imagine a more effective way to assure the public protection 
while preserving Pickett's property interest in his license to 
practice as a pharmacist. It is worthy to note that the 
revocation of Pickett's controlled substance license is not the 
equivalent of a license death penalty. It is possible for a 
license to be reissued after revocation in the event the Division 
and the Board is satisfied that the licensee is competent to 
practice and the public health and safety is no longer under any 
threat. 
C. PRIOR SANCTIONS OF THE PHARMACY BOARD AND DIVISION 
ARE NOT CONTROLLING 
Pickett urges that the order of the Division and Board is 
out of line with sanctions imposed by the Division and Board in 
prior cases. (Brief at 20). Pickett cites to ten case that were 
handled by the Pharmacy Board between 1986-1989. Beyond his own 
brief summary of the facts and results in those cases, Pickett 
has not met his burden of showing that the decision of the Board 
and Division is clearly unreasonable. The current Pharmacy Board 
is not bound by the disciplinary actions of past boards. 
Administrative agencies are generally free as a matter of law "of 
the limitations of stare decisis." Williams v. Public Service 
Commission, 754 P.2d 41, 52 (Utah 1988); see also, Reaveley v. 
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Public Service Commission, 436 P.2d 797, 20 Utah 2d 237 (1968); 
Almon, Inc., v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n., 696 P.2d 1210, 1213 
(Utah 1985) . 
Merely because a sanction appears more harsh than imposed in 
other cases does not render the sanction invalid. In Butz v. 
Glover Livestock Commission Co., 411 U.S. 182, 187, 36 L.Ed.2d 
142, 93 S.Ct. 1455 (1973), the Supreme Court confirmed that the 
employment of a sanction within the authority of an 
administrative agency is not rendered invalid in a particular 
case because it is more severe than sanctions imposed in other 
cases. 
The order of the Division and the Pharmacy Board was 
specifically tailored to meet the specific circumstances 
surrounding Pickett's violations. As specified above, the order 
is specifically designed to protect the public while allowing 
Pickett to practice his profession. The order also demonstrates 
an intent to protect the public and rehabilitate the offender. 
Like judges in regular courts of law, the Board must be given the 
discretion to mete out discipline in response to the unique 
circumstances of the case before it. In the instant case, the 
Board and Division has struck an appropriate balance to allow 
Pickett to continue to engage in his profession while providing 
adequate protection to the public. 
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2. PICKETT'S FAILURE TO RAISE PROCEDURAL ERRORS AT OR 
BEFORE THE HEARING CONSTITUTE WAIVER. 
The Division's failure to comply with its own statutory 
procedures is one of the grounds asserted by Pickett to support 
reversal of the Division's order. (Brief at 16.) Before 
addressing this issue on the merits, the Division objects to 
Pickett's failure to properly preserve this issue on appeal. In 
its Notice of Agency Action of January 28, 1992 (R./67), the 
Division provided notice to Pickett that he was entitled to a 
hearing "conducted before the Pharmacy Board." (R./67) The 
notice also stated, 
During the hearing, you will have the opportunity to 
present evidencef argue, respond, conduct cross-
examination and submit rebuttal evidence to the Board. 
After the hearing the Board will submit findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and a recommended order to the 
Director of the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing for his subsequent review and 
action. 
The same notice also identified the presiding officer as, J. 
Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge. (R./67) 
On April 21, 1992 a Notice of Hearing was delivered to 
Pickett. That notice identified a hearing date and reiterated 
that Pickett could present evidence to the Pharmacy Board and 
that Board would then submit a recommended order to the Director 
of the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing for 
his subsequent review and action. (R./61) 
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Pickett was provided with notice well in advance of the 
hearing of the Board's and Division Director's involvment in the 
administrative proceeding. However, the record, including the 
transcript is devoid of any objection prior to, or during the 
hearing, over the propriety of the procedures being followed by 
the Division. Because of Pickett's failure to raise any 
objection to the procedures at or before the hearing, his appeal 
on these issues should not be reviewed by the court. In 
Brinkerhoff, v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990), the Court of Appeals declared that "[i]t is axiomatic in 
our adversary system that a party must raise an objection in an 
earlier proceeding or waive its right to litigate the issue in 
subsequent proceedings." Appellants may not allege errors on 
appeal if the defects could have been cured by the trial court. 
The Brinkerhoff court held that this long established principle 
"applies equally to administrative proceedings. " JEd,. Based on 
this principle, the Brinkerhoff held that an appellant had waived 
his right to appeal an administrative agencies failure to notify 
the appellant that the hearing he was to appear at was to be 
formal or informal. JEd. This rule applied not withstanding that 
the appellant had raised his objection during closing argument. 
Id. See also, People Ex. Rel Woodward v. Brown, 770 P.2d 1373, 
1375 (Colo. App. 1989)(Physician's failure to raise claim that 
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delay in bringing disciplinary proceeding violated his rights to 
due process constituted waiver and were not considered on appeal) 
3. THE PHARMACY BOARD AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION 
OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING ARE 
APPROPRIATE PRESIDING OFFICERS. 
For the first time appeal, Picket contends that proceedings 
below were defective due to the Division's failure to follow the 
appropriate procedures. Pickett bases his contentions on two 
faulty assumptions. First, that the Director of the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing is not the agency head 
for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-2(h)(1989). (Brief at 16, 
17) Second that the ALJ and not the Division Director should 
have issued findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order. 
(Brief at 17) 
Section 63-46b-2(h), section defines the term "presiding 
officer" mean "an agency head or an individual or group of 
individuals designated by the agency head . . . to conduct an 
administrative proceeding." Utah Code Ann. § (1989). The term 
"Agency Head" is defined by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-2(c)(1989) as 
a "individual or body of individuals in whom the ultimate legal 
authority of the agency is vested by statute." 
Pickett's tortured interpretation of section 63-46b-2(c) 
negates the Division Director's role in the license disciplinary 
hearings in favor the Executive Director of the Department of 
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Commerce. While it true that the Department of Commerce is a 
superior agency to the Division and that the Department Director 
is the "agency head" over the department, this does not compel 
the conclusion that the executive director is the agency head 
over adjudications conducted by the Division. 
The Director of the Division of Occupational and 
Professional licensing is vested with authority to "perform all 
duties, functions, and responsibilities assigned to the division 
by law or rule with the collaboration and assistance of the 
boards established under this title." Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-4 
(Supp 1992). One of the Division's duties involves "issuing, 
refusing to issue, revoking, suspending, renewing, refusing to 
renew, or otherwise acting upon any license or licensee." Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-1-6 (Supp 1992). 
Among the Division Director's duties is to conduct 
adjudicative proceedings in matters of professional discipline. 
Section 58-1-16 concerns the Director's powers in connection with 
disciplinary actions: 
(1) (a) Before suspending, revoking, placing on 
probationer refusing to renew a license, and before 
issuing a cease and desist order, the division shall 
comply with the procedures and reguirements of Title 
63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act; . . . 
(b) By complying with the procedures and requirements 
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, the director may hold or 
cause to be held administrative hearings regarding any 
other matter affecting the division or the activities 
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of any person authorized to practice his occupation or 
profession under this title. 
(2) (a) All adjudicative proceedings shall be held 
before an appropriate presiding officer, as designated 
by the director, (b) The presiding officer shall make 
written recommendations for action, findings of fact, 
and conclusions of law. 
(c) The director, with the concurrence of the 
appropriate board, may issue a written order based on 
the recommendations but is not bound to follow the 
recommendations of the presiding officer. 
(d) If the director does not issue an order within ten 
days after the presiding officer has made the 
recommendations, the recommendations of the presiding 
officer shall become the order. 
Utah Code Ann § (Supp. 1992). The reference to "director" in the 
above statutes refers specifically to the director of the 
Division and not the Department Director. Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-2 
(1990)("Director" means the director of the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing.). 
As the head of the Division, the Director may designate who 
will serve as the appropriate presiding officer at any given 
phase of a adjudicative proceeding. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
2(h), applicable to Division proceedings by statute, provides: 
(i) "Presiding officer" means an agency head, or an 
individual or body of individuals designated by the 
agency head, by the agency's rules, or by statute to 
conduct an adjudicative proceeding. 
(ii) If fairness to the parties is not compromised, 
an agency may substitute one presiding officer for 
another during any proceeding. 
(iii) A person who acts as a presiding officer at one 
phase of a proceeding need not continue as 
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presiding officer through all phases of a 
proceeding. 
Id. (emphasis added). The Director is within his statutory 
authority when he designates an ALJ and the appropriate board to 
act as the "appropriate presiding officer" at a hearing. 
Designation of the Board as the presiding officer for 
purposes of issuing an order is also contemplated by statutes 
governing the Department and the Division (See eg. U.C.A. §§ 
13-1-125 and 58-1-8.5). The designation is "appropriate" since 
the Board, not the ALJ, is the entity of peers with specialized 
knowledge and expertise to evaluate and weigh the evidence. 
Although the Notice of Agency Action identified Judge Steven 
Eklund as the "presiding officer" the notice also indicated that 
the Pharmacy Board would be receiving evidence and issuing its 
recommended findings to the Director for action. (R./61, 67) 
This consistent with section 58-17-9 which vests authority in the 
Division, in collaboration with the Board, to refuse to issue or 
3
. Utah Code Ann. 13-1-12. Order by hearing officer or body -
Appeal of order to the division director or the executive director. 
(1) (a) At the close of an adjudicative proceeding, ihe 
administrative law judge or an occupational board or 
representative committee with £issistance from the administrative 
law judge, shall issue an order. 
(b) The order may be appealed to the executive director or 
the division director for review. 
(2) If a division director is unable for any reason 10 
fairly review or rule upon an order of the administrative law 
judge or a board or committee, the executive director shall 
review and rule upon the order. (Supp. 1992) 
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renew, suspend, revoke, or restrict the license of pharmacists 
who are found in violation of any one of a number of statutory 
and regulatory standards. Utah Code Ann. § 58-17-9 and -11 (1992 
Cum Supp.) 
In addition, the fact that Division Director signed the 
order adopting the recommended order of the Pharmacy Board was 
not improper. The Division Director, was acting as the presiding 
officer at the time he signed the Order. Moreover, other than 
Pickett's bald assertion of substantial prejudice, he fails to 
articulate a single reason how he was prejudiced by the Board's 
failure also to sign the Order. The record reflects that the 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommended order were 
issued by the Board (R./35) and subsequently adopted as the final 
order by the Division Director. (R./34). This is consistent with 
requirements of Title 58 requiring a concurrence of the Board and 
Director and the Utah Administrative Procedures Act requiring 
that orders be signed by the presiding officer. 
Any confusion over who was acting as presiding officer was 
resolved at the hearing. Pickett's failure to raise any 
objection to the adjudicative procedures below constitutes waiver 
of his right to raise this as an issue on appeal or claim 
substantial prejudice. 
4. THE DIVISION DIRECTOR'S PARTICIPATION AT THE 
HEARING DID NOT DEPRIVE PICKETT OF A FAIR HEARING. 
Pickett contends that the Division Director's involvement at 
the hearing deprived him of due process. (Brief at 8, 18) 
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Specifically, Pickett mischaracterizes Director Robinson's 
questions posed to him as aggressive interrogation. (Brief at 
8). It well recognized that litigants in administrative 
adjudications have a "due process right to receive a fair trial 
in front of a fair tribunal." Nelson v. Department of Employment 
Sec. , 801 P.2d 158, 162 (Utah App. 1990); Bunnell v. Industrial 
Comm'n of Utah, 740 P.2d 1331, 1333, (Utah 1987). However, 
"administrative proceedings neexi not possess the formality of 
judicial proceedings." Nelson at: 163. 
Pickett disapproves of the manner in which the Division 
Director, asked various questions of him during the trial. A 
partial transcript of the proceedings, including the questions 
posed by Director Robinson have been provided to the court. It 
difficult to fathom from the transcript how the questions posed 
by the Director can be characterized in good faith as aggressive 
interrogation. Not a single objection was raised by Pickett, or 
his counsel to the questions as they were being asked. Moreover, 
the Director's questions were merely aimed at filling in gaps in 
the story and eliciting a certain degree of detail that was 
lacking from Pickett's testimony. Because the relevant facts 
were not in dispute, few questions were asked by either counsel 
for the Division or Pickett's counsel about the relevant events 
that transpired. Moreover, Pickett's main defense was to bring 
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in factors to explain and attempt to mitigate matters in his 
favor. (Transcript at 9). It appears from the follow up 
questions asked by Director Robinson, that he was asking 
questions of Pickett to determine whether Pickett could 
appreciate the serious nature of the mistakes he admittedly made. 
Pickett did not object to the questions, nor was he deprived 
of the ability to have his counsel engage in any rehabilitative 
questions that counsel might have considered appropriate. Like 
Pickett's failure to object to the alleged procedural mistakes 
claimed as error on this appeal, his failure to make an object to 
the questions asked by the Director constitutes a waiver of his 
right to raise this issue on appeal. Ellison, Inc., v. Board of 
Review, 749 P. 2d 1280, 1285 (Utah App. 1988). Moreover, there is 
no evidence, and none offered by Pickett, that demonstrates that 
the Director's questions had any impact on the Pharmacy Board's 
findings, conclusions and recommendations. Pickett also has also 
failed to show how the Director's participation predisposed the 
board to enter a more harsh sanction against Pickett. 
5. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR'S REVIEW DID NOT DEPRIVE PICKETT 
OF DUE PROCESS 
Pickett urges that his right to due process were violated by 
the Executive Director's review of the Division's order. 
According to Pickett, the alleged due process violation is 
apparently the result of some inherent bias on the part of the 
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Executive Director due to the fact that the Division Director is 
his appointee.6 (Brief at 19) Pickett also assumes, without 
any support from the record, that the Executive Director made his 
decision without further hearing or independent consideration. 
(Brief at 19) 
Pickett has not even raised an appreciable issue of bias on 
the part of the Executive Director that would even warrant a 
minimal response. It is troubling how Pickett can even raise an 
inference of bad motive or impartiality without so much as a 
shred of evidence. 
Agency review by the Department was conducted pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 (1989). Both the Division and Pickett 
submitted briefs asserting their positions. It is also apparent 
from the Order on Review (R./ 1-9), that neither Pickett nor 
Division's counsel requested oral argument. (R./l) Consequently, 
none was granted. Pickett's bald assertions of impropriety and 
bias is completely spurious and unfounded. 
6. PICKETT WAIVED THE RIGHT TO HAVE A QUORUM OF THE 
BOARD PRESENT. 
The findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommended 
order indicates that only two members of the five member Pharmacy 
6
. Actually, David E. Robinson was appointed by David Buhler 
who no longer serves as the Executive Director. The current 
Director, Ted Stewart, did not appoint David E. Robinson. The 
Director also serves at the pleasure of the Governor. 
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Board were present to participate at the hearing.(R./36) The 
record further reflects that Pickett waived the requirement that 
a quorum be present. (R./36) Pickett now urges that he only 
intended to proceed with a hearing with two board member present 
but did not waive consideration by a quorum of the Board. (Brief 
at 17 ) . 
Other than Pickett's bald assertion, there is no evidence on 
the record to support his assertion. Pickett's intent was 
apparently silent when waiving the requirement of a quorum. The 
partial transcript lacks any indication of what Pickett intended. 
Consequently, Pickett cannot meet his burden on this appeal and 
should not be permitted to take back his waiver because he 
unexpressed intentions differed from what he received. Pickett's 
assertion is created as an afterthought. The lack of a quorum 
was not raised on review with the Department and is not supported 
by any evidence whatsoever on the record. 
CONCLUSION 
The Division's Order revoking Pickett's controlled substance 
license and placing his pharmacists license on three years 
probation was reasonable and within the Division's discretion. 
Pickett's allegations of procedural defects at his hearing are 
without merit and have not been properly preserved on this 
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appeal. Consequently, the Division requests that its Order be 
upheld on review. 
Submitted this ^yMn day of January, 1993 
C ^ 
ERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
jtff/ff , c e r t i fy that on K/rZf. 
I served two copies of the foregoing RESPONDENTS' BRIEF to 
George K. Fadel, counsel for Petitioner in this matter, by-
mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage 
prepaid to the following address: 
GEORGE K. FADEL 
170 West 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84010 
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FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF 
JACK W. PICKETT 
TO PRACTICE AS A PHARMACIST AND 
TO DISPENSE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
AND THE LICENSES OF 
8ERVUS DRUG CO. 
AS A PHARMACY AND AS A DISPENSARY 
FOR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES IN 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
O R D E R 
Case No. OPL-92-6 
The attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommended Order are hereby adopted by the Director of the 
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing of the State of 
Utah. Respondent Jack W. Pickett's license to dispense 
controlled substances is thus revoked, effective thirty (30) days 
from the date of this Order. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the revoked license, both wall 
and wallet sizes, as well as the embossed certificate, thus be 
surrendered to the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing. 
Dated this ^ y 5 ^ day of June, 1992. 
,1 W •'. 
David E. Robinson 
Director 
S,,E A L 
'"'A* Administrative review of this Order may be obtained by 
filing a request for agency review with the executive director of 
the Depjartinent within thirty (30) days after issuance of this 
Order. Any such request must comply with the requirements of the 
Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-12(l) and R151-46b-12 of the departmental 
rules which govern agency review. 
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OP OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF : 
JACK W. PICKETT : 
TO PRACTICE AS A PHARMACIST AND : FINDINGS OF FACT 
TO DISPENSE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND THE LICENSES OF : AND RECOMMENDED ORDER 
SERVUS DRUG CO. : 
AS A PHARMACY AND AS A DISPENSARY : Case No. OPL-92-6 
FOR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES IN : 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Appearances: 
Delia M. Welch for the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing 
George K. Fadel for Respondents 
BY THE BOARD: 
A hearing was conducted in the above-entitled matter on May 
26, 1992 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for 
the Department of Commerce, and the State Board of Pharmacy. 
Board members present for the hearing were Dennis R. White and 
Don Sterling. The remaining Board members, Frank Morris, Mark L. 
Johnson and De'lbert A. Park, were absent. David E. Robinson, the 
Director of the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing, was present. Respondents consented that the hearing 
be conducted as scheduled, despite the lack of a majority of 
Board members present for the hearing. Thereafter, evidence was 
offered and received. 
The Board, being fully advised in the premises, now enters 
the following: 
FINDINGS OP FACT 
1. Respondent Jack W. Pickett (hereinafter, Respondent) is, 
and at all times relevant to this proceeding has been, licensed 
to practice as a pharmacist and to dispense controlled substances 
in the State of Utah. Respondent has been a licensed pharmacist 
since approximately 1954. Respondent Servus Drug Co. 
(hereinafter, Servus Drug Co.) is, and at all time relevant to 
this proceeding has been, licensed as a pharmacy and a dispensary 
for controlled substances in the State of Utah. This record does 
not reflect the exact date those licenses were issued. 
Respondent is employed by Servus Drug Co., a business which is 
owned by Respondent's wife. 
2. On twelve occasions between May 20, 1991 and July 30, 
1991, Respondent dispensed various dosages of either Tranxene, a 
Schedule IV controlled substance, Esgic, a Schedule III 
controlled substance, or Soma, a legend drug, to a Todd Schriver. 
In certain instances, Respondent dispensed those controlled 
substances without a physician's authorization to do so. On 
occasion, Respondent dispensed medications in either unlabeld 
prescription vials or a paper bag bearing no labels or 
instructions. 
3. There is a lack of sufficient evidence Respondent made 
false or forged prescriptions as to dispense the above-stated 
controlled substances or other medications. Further, there is a 
lack of sufficient evidence to conclude Respondent knew Mr. 
2 
Schriver was drug dependent. Respondent acknowledges his 
prescriptive practices were improper and he failed to adequately 
document the controlled substances or other medications which he 
dispensed. Respondent often dispensed those controlled 
substances or other medications in the manner requested by Mr. 
Schriver# who often suggested the use of either unlabeled vials 
or other inappropriate containers. 
4. There is no substantial evidence Respondent has 
improperly dispensed controlled substances or other medications 
to other individuals. Respondent asserts he has taken remedial 
measures to address the acknowledged deficiencies in his 
practices now under review. However, there is a lack of 
substantial evidence as to the specific nature of corrective 
measures Respondent may have undertaken in that regard. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Utah Code Ann. Section 58-17-9 provides the Division, in 
collaboration with the Board, may suspend, revoke or restrict the 
license of a pharmacist on one or more of the following grounds: 
(5) being found by the board to be in 
violation of this chapter or rules adopted 
under this chapter; 
(6) acts of unprofessional conduct as 
defined by statute or by rule of the 
division, in collaboration with the board, as 
follows: 
. . . . 
(g) violation of the federal 
Controlled Substance Act, the Utah 
Controlled Substance Act, or rules 
and regulations adopted under 
either of them. 
Section 58-17-10(1) provides it is unlawful for any person to: 
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(m) dispense a prescription drug to anyone 
who does not have a prescription from a 
practitioner or to anyone who he knows or 
should know is attempting to obtain drugs by 
fraud or misrepresentation. 
Section 58-17-22 further provides: 
(8) Each drug or device dispensed shall 
have a label securely affixed to the 
container indicating the following: 
(a) the name, address, and 
telephone number of the pharmacy; 
(b) the serial number; 
• • • • 
(d) the name of the patient . . 
(e) the name of the prescriber; 
(f) the directions for use and 
cautionary statements, if any, 
which are contained in the 
prescription order or are needed; 
(g) the trade, generic or 
chemical name, amount dispensed and 
strength of dosage form, but if 
multiple ingredient products with 
established proprietary or 
nonproprietary names are 
prescribed, those products' names 
may be used. 
R153-17-12 of the rules which govern the practice of pharmacy 
further define unprofessional conduct to include: 
(1) Violating any federal or state statute 
or rule dealing with controlled substances or 
other drugs; 
(2) Fraud or deception in the practice of 
pharmacy; 
(3) Negligence or incompetence in the 
practice of pharmacy. 
With respect to a license to dispense controlled substances, 
Section 58-37-6(4)(a) provides such a license "may be suspended, 
placed on probation, or revoked" by the department upon finding 
that the licensee has: 
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(vi) violated any department rule that 
reflects adversely on the licensee's 
reliability and integrity with respect to 
controlled substances; 
In addition to the acts and practices set forth in the just-
stated statute, R156-37-9 provides the Division may revoke, 
suspend, restrict or place on probation a controlled substance 
license if the licensee: 
(2) has violated any federal or state law 
relating to controlled substances; 
• • • • 
(7) violates restrictions upon controlled 
substances, prescriptions and administration 
as contained in these rules; and/or 
(8) knowingly prescribes, sells, gives 
away or administers, directly or indirectly, 
or offers to prescribe, sell, furnish, give 
away, or administer any controlled substance 
to a drug dependent person, as defined in 
Utah Code Ann., 58-37-2(14), except for 
legitimate medical purposes as permitted by 
law. 
Section 58-37-6(7)(a) provides: 
No person may write or authorize a 
prescription for a controlled substance 
unless he is: 
(i) a practitioner authorized to 
prescribe drugs and medicine under 
the laws of this state or under the 
laws of another state having 
similar standards; and 
(ii) licensed under this chapter 
or under the laws of another state 
having similar standards. 
Section 58-37-6(7)(c) further provides: 
(i) No controlled substance may be 
dispensed without the written prescription of 
a practitioner, if the written prescription 
is required by the federal Controlled 
Substances Act. 
Section 58-37-8(3)(a) also provides it is unlawful for any 
person: 
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(i) who is subject to this chapter to 
distribute or dispense a controlled substance 
in violation of this chapter; 
Finally, Section 58-37-8(4)(a) provides it is unlawful for any 
person knowingly and intentionally: 
(iii) to make any false or forged 
prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, 
or to alter any prescription or written order 
issued or written under the terms of this 
chapter; 
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent 
material information in any application, 
report, or other document required to be kept 
by this chapter or to willfully make any 
false statement in any prescription, order, 
report, or record required by this chapter; 
Respondent violated Section 58-17-10(1)(m) when he dispensed 
prescription drugs and controlled substances without any 
practitioner's authorization to do so. Under the circumstances, 
Respondent should have known Mr. Schriver was attempting to 
obtain drugs by either fraud or misrepresentation. Respondent 
failed to comply with Section 58-17-22(8) when he dispensed drugs 
in containers without appropriate labeling. Respondent violated 
R153-17-12(2) when he prepared documents to purportedly reflect a 
physician's authorization for the medication which was dispensed 
when, in fact, no authorization was made. 
Respondent also violated Section 58-37-6(7)(a) and Section 
58-37-6(7)(c)(i). By reason thereof, Respondent engaged in 
unprofessional conduct, as defined in R153-17-12(1). He was also 
grossly negligent in his practice of pharmacy, which reflects 
unprofessional conduct with respect to R153-17-12(3). However, 
there is a lack of sufficient evidence to find and thus conclude 
Respondent violated Section 58-37-8(4) (a)(iii) or (iv) . 
6 
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Thus, Respondent has engaged in unprofessional conduct and a 
proper basis exists to enter a disciplinary sanction with respect 
to his licensure as a pharmacist and his ability to dispense 
controlled substances in this state. However, no proper basis 
exists to enter any disciplinary sanction with respect to the 
license of Servus Drug Co. as a pharmacy or a dispensary of 
controlled substances. 
Respondents misconduct represents an egregious departure 
from those standards which govern his profession. Further, 
Respondent engaged in such misconduct on numerous occasions. 
Respondents conduct does not merely reflect a singular, 
haphazard exercise of his duties as a pharmacist. Rather, 
Respondent repeatedly failed to properly dispense controlled 
substances and other medication. Various statutes and rules 
appropriately restrict the manner in which controlled substances 
may be dispensed, yet Respondent frequently failed to comply with 
the requirements of those statutes and rules. 
Therefore, an appropriately severe sanction should enter 
with regard to Respondents license to dispense controlled 
substances. Further, adequate restrictions must exist to 
appropriately protect the public health, safety and welfare and 
ensure Respondent continually complies with those standards which 
govern his profession. The recommended order set forth below is 
thus necessary to adequately monitor Respondents future conduct 
as a pharmacist, to appropriately prompt necessary corrective and 
remedial action required of Respondent and to ensure controlled 
substances are dispensed in a manner consistent with the dictates 
7 
of state and federal law. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED Respondent's license to dispense 
controlled substances is revoked. 
It is further ordered Respondent's license as a pharmacist 
be placed on probation for three (3) years, subject to the 
following terms and conditions: 
1. Within thirty (30) days from the date 
this Recommended Order may be adopted by the 
Director of the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing, Respondent shall 
submit a written practice plan, which shall 
be subject to Board review and approval. 
Said plan shall provide for another 
pharmacist to be employed by Servus Drug Co. 
Said pharmacist shall thereafter establish 
proper record keeping, inventory control and 
dispensary procedures for controlled 
substances at the pharmacy. 
2. Respondent and the just-referenced 
pharmacist shall initially meet with the 
Board each month during the first three (3) 
months of this probationary term. 
Thereafter, Respondent and the pharmacist 
shall meet with the Board every six (6) 
months. During those meetings, the Board 
will review the ongoing efforts to implement 
proper record keeping practices, appropriate 
management of controlled substance inventory 
and proper procedures with regard to any 
controlled substances which are dispensed 
through the pharmacy in question. 
3.' The Division shall periodically audit 
the controlled substance records of Servus 
Drug Co. 
4. Within ninety (90) days from the date 
this Recommended Order may be adopted, 
Respondent shall successfully complete the 
jurisprudence examination generally required 
of all pharmacists licensed to practice in 
this state. 
Should Respondent fail to comply with the terms and 
8 
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conditions set forth herein, or otherwise violate any statute or 
rule which governs his license as a pharmacist, further 
proceedings shall be conducted and a determination made whether a 
sanction of greater severity than that set forth herein is 
warranted. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the ^ / day of June, 1992, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, RECOMMENDED ORDER AND ORDER was sent first 
class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Jack W. Pickett 
Servus Drug 
55 North Main 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
George K. Fadel 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful Ut 84010 
W^Mi IMV" i'U/r/r 
Carol W. Inglesby * 
Administrative Assistant 
ORDER ON AGENCY REVIEW 
BEFORE THE 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES 
OF JACK W. PICKETT TO 
PRACTICE AS A PHARMACIST AND TO 
DISPENSE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
AND THE LICENSES OF 
SERVUS DRUG CO, AS A PHARMACY 
AND AS A DISPENSARY FOR 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER ON REVIEW 
CASE NO. OPL-92-6 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 24, 1992, following a hearing on a petition involving 
Jack W. Pickett and Servus Drug Co. ("Respondents") before the 
Administrative Law Judge and the State Board of Pharmacy, the 
Director of the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
(the "Division") adopted the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Recommended Order of the Board. The Order revoked Respondent 
Pickett's license to dispense controlled substances and placed his 
license as a pharmacist on probation for three years, subject to 
certain terms and conditions. Respondent was represented by an 
attorney throughout the proceeding, as well as on review. He 
requested agency review on July 1, 1992, and also was given until 
July 27, 1992, to supplement his brief requesting review. Oral 
argument was neither requested nor held. 
In his request for review, Respondent requests that the Order 
be modified so that he may continue as a licensed pharmacist. 
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STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW 
Review is conducted pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 
63-4613-12, and Rule 151-46b-12 of the Rules of Procedure for 
Adjudicative Proceedings before the Department of Commerce. 
THE ISSUES REVIEWED 
1. Whether the Order contains procedural defects sufficient 
to warrant overturning it; 
2. Whether Respondent was unfairly deprived of a fair 
hearing where the Division Director was present and participated in 
questioning Respondent, thus either becoming an "advocate" rather 
than a "tribunal", or unduly influencing the Recommended Order; 
3- Whether the Order is not supported by the Findings of 
Fact; and 
4. Whether the Order of revocation was arbitrary and 
capricious, particularly when compared with penalties in other 
cases. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent does not contest the Findings of Fact entered 
into by the Board, and consequently they are adopted herein for 
purposes of this review. 
2. The Order found that Respondent has engaged in acts or 
conduct which violated §58-17-10 (1) (m) ; §58-17-22 (8) ; and Rule 153-
17-12. Specifically, it found that Respondent had, on twelve 
occasions, dispensed Schedule IV and Schedule III controlled 
substances, as well as a legend drug, without a physician's 
authorization, or without proper labels, to one customer. 
-2-
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Respondent apparently acknowledged that his prescriptive practices 
were improper and that he did not adequately document dispensing 
certain drugs. The Findings concluded that there was a lack of 
sufficient evidence to find that Respondent made false or forged 
prescriptions, as had been charged in the Petition. 
3. Respondent argues as grounds for review that the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order were not signed 
by the presiding officer. They were in fact not signed by either 
the Board or the Administrative Law Judge. The Order adopting the 
Findings, Conclusions and Recommended Order was signed by the 
Division Director. 
4. The Director was present at the hearing. However, the 
limited record available for review does not indicate what, if any, 
questions were put to Respondent, or any other witness, by the 
Director. No evidence or transcripts were produced by Respondent, 
or arguments made, which would enable a determination to be made as 
to whether or not the Director acted as an advocate, or whether his 
presence unduly influenced the process. 
5. Respondent does not indicate which portions of the Order 
are not supported by the Findings of Fact. 
6. Respondent supplemented the request for review by listing 
ten cases previously decided by the Division and Board against 
other pharmacists, in which the penalties were less than those in 
this case. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In Respondent's request for review, he cites no statutory 
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or other authority for the proposition that the Findings, 
Conclusions and Recommended Order must be signed by the Board or 
the Administrative Law Judge. The procedure does not appear to 
violate the Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), which, at §63-
46b-10, requires that in formal proceedings, the presiding officer 
shall sign and issue the order. In this case, the order was signed 
and issued by the division director, who was the "presiding 
officer" for purposes of overseeing the proceedings. Pursuant to 
§58-1-16(2), the director may designate a presiding officer in 
disciplinary proceedings, which shall make written recommendations, 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. For purposes of 
conducting a hearing and making recommendations, the director 
designated the Board as the "presiding officer". There is no 
requirement that the recommendation be signed. The procedure 
followed herein, where the Division Director signed the final Order 
adopting the Board's recommendations was not improper. 
2. Whether the Director's presence and participation 
constituted his an "advocate" is a contention which appears to be 
without merit. As noted above, Respondent produced no evidence, 
transcripts or arguments which would assist in reviewing this 
issue. Without such a showing, the Director's participation, if 
any, cannot be deemed to have been improper in any way, nor can it 
be declared to have unduly influenced the Board's recommendations. 
Common practice is for the Board to deliberate without the presence 
of the Director; there was no evidence presented by Respondent as 
to whether or not this in fact occurred -- nor that it would be 
-4-
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improper even if it had. If the Director were not present at the 
hearing, or not asking questions, could Respondent have raised the 
argument that he was thus not qualified to judge the case? 
3. Respondent next argues that the Order is not supported by 
the findings of fact. It is difficult to evaluate Respondent's 
claim where he does not contest the findings, and provides no 
specific statements of where the findings may be deficient. The 
undisputed facts can be summarized as follows: Respondent 
dispensed dosages of a Schedule IV controlled substance, a Schedule 
III controlled substance and a legend drug, either without a 
physician's authorization, or dispensed them in unlabeled vials or 
in a paper bag with no labels or instructions. These findings 
constitute a legally sufficient basis for the Order. Section 58-
17-9 provides that the Division may suspend, revoke or restrict a 
pharmacist's license for violating the law. Further, Section 58-
17-10(1) specifically makes it a violation to dispense a 
prescription drug without a prescription, or to fail to properly 
label prescriptions. 
4. Finally, Respondent argues that the Order revoking 
Respondent's controlled substance license, and imposing a three 
year probation on this pharmacist's license, is too severe. 
Respondent points out certain factors in Respondent's favor: 
a. Pharmacy is Respondent's lifetime profession; 
b. He was adjudged to have dispensed improperly only to 
one long-time customer, who arguably had oral approval from a 
physician for the refills; 
-5-
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c. The penalty is more severe than penalties in other 
cases. 
5. Two separate penalties are at issue here. The first one, 
revocation of Respondent's controlled substance license, is 
mitigated somewhat by two factors. The Order allows Respondent to 
employ another pharmacist, under Board supervision, to establish 
controls with respect to controlled substances. Second, an 
examination of prior cases reveals that the Division and Board on 
occasion entertain requests to reinstate licenses. The second 
penalty, a three-year probation of Respondent's pharmacist license, 
was not the most harsh that the Order could have imposed; 
subsection 58-17-11 also allows the division to suspend or revoke 
a license. With probation, Respondent can continue practicing as 
a pharmacist, subject to Board supervision -- he simply cannot 
personally dispense controlled substances. 
6. Of the other Division proceedings against pharmacists 
cited by Respondent, such precedent is of limited value for several 
reasons. The cases cited are somewhat old: the most recent are 
approximately three years old; other cases are as many as six years 
old. An examination of the cases cited by Respondent, as well as 
others, yields ,more information not disclosed in the request for 
review. Note, for example, that the Leatherwood and Anderson 
orders, cited by Respondent, were pursuant to stipulation of the 
parties. (Also, Respondent omits to mention that Leatherwood's 
penalty actually was revocation, which was stayed in favor of 
suspension and probation) . In the Nielson case, the license of the 
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pharmacy itself, a corporation, was placed on probation, which was 
not the case in the order under review here. In other cases not 
cited by Respondent, severe sanctions were entered: for example, 
see Morrison, No. 85-63 (license indefinitely suspended by 
stipulation); Jensen, No. 86-05 (default revocation of pharmacist 
and controlled substance licenses); Evans, No. 88-20 (pharmacist 
license suspended, controlled substance license surrendered, by 
stipulation) . In addition, as pointed out by counsel for Division 
in its Response to the request for review, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has held that a sanction is not invalid only because it is more 
severe than sanctions in other cases. Finally, where the Board, 
the Administrative Law Judge and Director were present at the 
hearing, heard the testimony and were able to observe the 
Respondent's demeanor, and found that restrictions were necessary 
to protect the public health, safety and welfare, the sanction 
should not be overturned or modified unless a compelling reason can 
be demonstrated. 
7. In support of the penalty, the Order found that: 
a. "Respondent should have known [the patient] was 
attempting to obtain drugs by either fraud or 
misrepresentation." (Recommended Order, page 6) 
b. "Respondent violated R153-17-12(2) when he prepared 
documents to purportedly reflect a physician's authorization 
for the medication which was dispensed when, in fact, no 
authorization was made." (Page 6) 
c. Respondent engaged in "unprofessional conduct", was 
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"grossly negligent" (page 6); his conduct was an "egregious 
departure from those standards which govern his profession", 
and he engaged in such misconduct on "numerous occasions" 
(page 7). 
8. Respondent's request on review that the Order be modified 
so he can "continue as a licensed pharmacist" indicates an apparent 
misunderstanding of the Order. Under that order, Respondent can 
continue: his license to practice as a pharmacist is placed on 
probation and subject to various conditions, but he is not 
forbidden to practice. 
ORDER 
IT IS ORDERED THAT: 
The order is upheld in its entirety. Pursuant to Rule 151-
46b-12, the effective date of that order is ten days from the date 
that this order on review is mailed. 
Dated this 7 ^ day of July, 1992. 
David L. Buhler, Executive Director 
Department of Commerce 
NOTICE OF RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Judicial review of this Order may be sought by filing a 
Petition for Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of 
this Order. Any Petition for such Review must comply with the 
requirements set forth in Section 63-46b-14 and Section 63-46b-16. 
-8-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the ^ day of July, 1992, I caused 
to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order on 
Review, properly addressed, postage prepaid, to: 
Respondent: 
Jack W. Pickett 
Servus Drug Co, 
55 North Main Street 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Attorney for Respondent: 
George K. Fadel 
170 West 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84010 
and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to: 
David E. Robinson, Director 
Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing 
P.O Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Delia Welch, Assistant A.G. 
Beneficial Life Tower 
11th Floor 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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